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NOTES
The Criminalization of Maternal Conduct
During Pregnancy: A Decisionmaking

Model for Lawmakers
INTRODUCTION

In 1985 Pamela Rae Stewart was pregnant with her third child.' Stewart
and her husband lived with their two young daughters in a motel in San
Diego County, California. During the third trimester of her pregnancy,
Stewart sought and obtained prenatal care. At one of her visits it was found
that her pregnancy was complicated by a condition known as placenta
previa.2 On November 23, 1985, Stewart began bleeding heavily and was
taken to the hospital by ambulance, where she immediately consented to a

caesarian section. Her baby, Thomas Monson, Jr., was born with severe
brain damage and died on New Year's Day, 1986.1

Eight months after the birth of her child, Stewart was arrested and
charged with violating California's criminal child neglect statute which4
includes in its definition of "child" those "conceived but not yet born."

1. Facts about Pamela Rae Stewart's case are taken from the following sources: Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Demurrer to Complaint Without
Leave to Amend, People v. Stewart, (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 23, 1987) (No. M508197) [hereinafter
Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities] and Defendant's Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss, People v. Stewart, (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 23,
1987) (No. M508197) [hereinafter Defendant's Motion to Dismiss] on file with author; Bonavoglia, The Ordeal of Pamela Rae Stewart, Ms., July-Aug. 1987, at 92; Flynn, Woman
Charged in Fetal Neglect Did Not Abuse Drugs, Husband Says, San Diego Union, Sept. 30,
1986, at BI, col. 1; Chambers, Dead Baby's Mother Faces Criminal Charges on Acts in
Pregnancy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1986, at A10, col. 1.
2. Placentaprevia is a serious condition where the placenta essentially blocks the cervical
opening. It occurs in approximately one in two hundred pregnancies. D. DANFORTH & J.
ScoTT, OasTmEcs AND GYNECOLOGY 433 (5th ed. 1986).
3. Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 1, at 5.
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988). Section 270 reads in part:
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish
necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care
for his or her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine
not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment . . . not
exceeding one year ....
A child conceived but not yet born is to be deemed an existing person
insofar as this section is concerned.
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The prosecution charged that Stewart had disobeyed her doctor's advice by
taking illegal drugs, engaging in sexual intercourse with her husband, and
failing to go to the hospital as soon as she noticed any bleeding, thereby

causing the outcome of her pregnancy.'
A San Diego judge later granted Stewart's demurrer on the grounds that
she-hadbeen.,charged- under--.aninappipriAtatute. 6 In his dismissal,
however, Judge Amos encouraged the legislature to enact a statute "pro-

tecting the life of the unborn child under certain narrowly defined conditions." 7
Although the case of Pamela Rae Stewart is one of the few attempts to

impose criminal sanctions on a woman for her conduct during pregnancy,
it will likely not be the last.8 The subsequent session of the California
legislature saw the introduction of just such a bilP as Judge Amos suggested,

and other states with criminal child neglect and endangerment statutes are
free to extend those statutes to include fetuses, or draft entirely new
legislation which would create the crime of "fetal endangerment" or "fetal
abuse."
The purpose of this Note is to consider whether conduct by a pregnant
woman that may result in harm to her fetus should constitute a crime. This
question will be addressed first by examining the recent expansion of
maternal liability and the "geography"' 10 of pregnancy, then by discussing
principles of criminal law and punishment theory and analyzing the costs
and benefits to society of such criminalization. While most studies of this
issue have defined the problem as one of a conflict between the rights of
mother and fetus," this Note argues that a final determination that maternal
conduct should not be regulated through the use of the criminal sanction

5. Bonavoglia, supra note 1, at 93.
6. Id.; Chambers, Charges Against Mother in Death of Baby Are Thrown Out, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 27, 1987, at A25, col. 1. The legislative history of § 270 of the California Penal
Code reveals that its purpose was to guarantee that parents provide financial support for their
children, and that a 1923 amendment expanding the definition of "child" was simply to
require fathers to provide financial support to the women who were pregnant with their
children. See In re Clarke, 149 Cal. App. 2d 802, 309 P.2d 142 (1959); People v. Yates, 114
Cal. App. 782, 298 P.2d 961 (1931); Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
supra note 1.
7. Bonavoglia, supra note 1, at 93.
8. See Sherman, Keeping Baby Safe From Mom, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 3, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
9. S. 1070, 1987-88 Reg. Sess. (1987). The bill was later withdrawn and was reintroduced
in the subsequent session of the legislature. The bill was introduced to amend § 273(a) of the
California Penal Code ("Willful cruelty or unjustifiable punishment of child; endangering life
or health"). The amendment reads in part: "(3) Any person who, under circumstances or
conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully commits any illegal act which
causes any fetus to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering,
is punishable by imprisonment ... not to exceed one year ....

."

Id.

10. Gallagher, PrenatalInvasions & Interventions: What's Wrong With Fetal Rights, 10
H~av. WOMEN's L.J. 9, 13 (1987).

11. See, e.g., Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse," 101 HARv. L. REv. 994 (1988).
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need not rest on a resolution of that conflict, but rather, can and must be
informed by an interest in promoting healthy pregnancy outcomes at the
2
least cost to the individual woman, her fetus, and society.'
I.

A.

THE

CALL FOR CRIMINALIZATIoN

The Expanding Concept of Maternal Liability

Ustodcalycourts.-have--refused jo recognlize an action for harm to 3a
ed in utero unless the fetus was subsequently born alive.
fetus~hico
This "live birth" requirement was consistent with the view that the fetus
was part of the woman who carried it, 14 and that, except in "narrowly
defined situations," the fetus was not recognized as a person requiring
protection separate from that afforded the mother. 5 Recently, however,
courts have allowed recovery even if the cause is not based on subsequent
live birth,16 and have expanded the protectable interests of the fetus beyond
those held by the pregnant woman.
By separating the interests of the fetus from those of the mother and

granting the fetus even limited legal status, the door has been opened for
a woman to be considered a legal adversary of the fetus she is carrying and
to be held liable for her conduct that may cause it injury. 17 Prenatal tort

12. For a discussion of the expansion of "fetal rights" (including the expansion of tort
liability) and the conflict with women's constitutional rights, see Gallagher, supra note 10;
Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts With Women's Constitutional Rights to
Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986) [hereinafter Johnsen I];
Nelson, Buggy & Weil, ForcedMedical Treatment of Pregnant Women: "Compelling Each to
Live as Seems Good to the Rest, " 37 HASTiNGS L.J. 703 (1986); Parness, The Duty to Prevent
Handicaps: Laws Promoting the Prevention of Handicaps to Newborns, 5 W. NEw ENG. L.
REv. 431 (1983); Parness & Pritchard, To Be or Not to Be: Protectingthe Unborn'sPotentiality
of Life, 51 U. CQN. L. Ray. 257 (1982); Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus,
5 J. LEGAL MED. 63 (1984); Stearns, MaternalDuties During Pregnancy: Toward a Conceptual
Framework, 21 NEw ENG. L. REv. 595 (1986); Note, Constitutional Limitations on State
Intervention in PrenatalCare, 67 VA. L. REv. 1051 (1981); Note, ParentalLiabilityfor Prenatal
Injury, 14 CoLuM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 47 (1978) [hereinafter ParentalLiability]; Note, Recovery
for PrenatalInjuries: The Right of a Child Against Its Mother, 10 SuFFoLK U.L. REv. 582
(1976).
13. The "born alive" rule was originally used to protect women whose pregnancies ended
in stillbirth. Gallagher, supra note 10, at 40 (citing P. HOF-ER & N. HULL, MURDERING
MoHaEns: INFANncmE IN ENGLAND AND NEW ENGLAD-1558-1803, at 65-91 (1981)). See also
Note, Live Birth: A Condition Precedent to Recognition of Rights, 4 HoFsTRA L. REv. 805
(1976).
14. Johnsen I, supra note 12, at 601.
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
16. Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984) (holding that the fetus
was a person for purposes of Massachusetts' vehicular homicide statute).
17. Johnsen I, supra note 12, at 600. See Sherman, supra note 8.
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claims,18 once meant to compensate for parents' loss,' 9 have been increasingly
directed at parents. 20 Courts in Michigan, and until recently in Illinois, have
held that a woman may be sued for action taken during her pregnancy that
adversely affects the development of her child prior to birth. 2' And in
decisions perhaps most dramatically representative of this separation of
interests, several courts have ordered women to submit to caesarian sections
against their wishes when physicians believed vaginal birth might result in
harm to the fetus. 22
The concept of maternal conduct as constituting "abuse" or "neglect"
has found increasing acceptance in the interpretation of statutes. In New
Jersey, the Bureau of Child Services may take custody of an "unborn
child" when the child's welfare is endangered by the conduct of its mother.2
After a Michigan court held that the state could introduce evidence of a
mother's "abusive" or "neglectful" conduct during pregnancy in a subsequent custody hearing,2 the Indiana, Oklahoma, and Florida legislatures
followed suit by amending their states' child abuse statutes to "allow
authorities to investigate and possibly take custody of children who are
born suffering from their mothers' substance abuse.''25
Thus far this expanded definition of maternal liability has not extended
to the criminal law, 26 which has grown steadily in its "protection" of the
fetus. Many states have enacted criminal "feticide" statutes that make the

18. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK OF Tm LAW OF TORTS 335 (4th ed. 1971).
The right of a fetus which is subsequently born alive to maintain a cause of action for prenatal
injuries was first recognized in 1946. Id. at 336-37 (citing Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138
(D.D.C. 1946)). That right is now recognized in every American jurisdiction. Id. at 337. If
the child is born alive and subsequently dies from the injuries inflicted, then an action can be
maintained for wrongful death. Id. at 336-37. See, e.g., Mone v. Greyhound Lines, 368 Mass.
354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975).
19. Gallagher, supra note 10, at 401.
20. See ParentalLiability, supra note 12.
21. Stallman v. Youngquist, 152 Ill. App. 3d 683, 504 N.E.2d 920 (1987), rev'd, 125 Ill.2d
267, N.E.2d (1988); Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869
(1980).
22. Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
See Annas, Forced Caesarian:The Most Unkindest Cut of All, HAsrnGs CENTER REp., June,
1986, at 16. See also Gallagher, supra note 10; Nelson, Buggy & Weil, supra note 12.
23. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-1 1 (West 1981). Exactly how the Bureau would "take custody"
is uncertain and evidently has not been tested.
24. In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980).
25. Sherman, supra note 8, at 24.
26. An examination of various state criminal abortion laws is outside the scope of this
Note. It is sufficient to say that it is unlikely that a woman's conduct would be sanctioned
under such statutes, which are directed primarily at her medical counselors. For a discussion
of existing criminal law regarding the fetus, including criminal abortion statutes, see Parness,
Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting the Potentiality of Human Life, 22
HARv. J. ON Laois. 97 (1985) [hereinafter Parness I]. For discussion of criminal liability for
the destruction of a fetus see Cass, 392 Mass. at 803 n.3, 467 N.E.2d at 1327 n.3.
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destruction of a fetus a crime parallel to homicide of a born person. 27 In
California and New York, the fetus is expressly included in the general
homicide statutes.2 In 1986 the Minnesota legislature adopted. a comprehensive statutory scheme of "crimes against unborn children," which includes the premeditated2 9 and intentional murder of a fetus, 0 and negligent
acts which cause injury to the fetus." The Minnesota laws are unique
however, in that they encompass acts which do not necessarily result in the
destruction of the fetus. These crimes include assault of a fetus,32 and injury
of a fetus in the commission of a crime.33 They are also unique in that the
pregnant woman has been expressly excluded from the statute as a potential
criminal actor.3 4 While the history of other "feticide" statutes would suggest
that they are directed at criminalizing acts of third parties against the fetus
itself or against the mother, 35 it is uncertain whether they may be used to
36

sanction injurious maternal conduct.
The concept of maternal liability has seen the greatest expansion, however,
in recent commentaries urging lawmakers to adopt new or more comprehensive statutes for the purpose of "extending protection and respect for

27. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.2 (Smith-Hurd 1988) ("A person commits the
offense of intentional homicide of an unborn child if, in performing acts which cause the
death of an unborn child, he without lawful justification: (1) either intended to cause the
death of or do great bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn child or knew that
such acts would cause death or great bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn child
....
"). See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979); MICH. Comp'. LAWS ANN. § 750.322
(West 1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 585.13 (1986);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 713 (West 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (1988); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (West 1982). The majority
in Cass noted, "Many of the courts which have considered the question have decided that the
destruction of a fetus should be considered homicide but, because that rule would conflict
with established precedent, have concluded that establishing such a rule requires legislative
action." Cass, 392 Mass. at 803, 467 N.E.2d at 1327.
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988) ("Murder is the unlawful killing of a human
being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 1987)
("Homicide means conduct which causes the death of a person or an unborn child with which
a female has been pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks ....
29. MINN. STAT. AN. § 609.2661 (West 1987).
30. Id. at § 609.2662.
31. Id. at § 609.267 ("Assault of an unborn child in the first degree"); id. at § 609.2671
("Assault of an unborn child in the second degree"); id. at § 609.2672 ("Assault of an unborn
child in the third degree").
32. See supra note 31.
33. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.267-.268.
34. Id. at § 609.266.
35. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. AiNN. § 66-8-101.1 (Supp. 1988). The statute protects the pregnant
woman from injury sustained as a result of the unlawful operation of a motor vehicle. Id.
36. Section 187 of the California Penal Code, see supra note 28, was enacted after the
California Supreme Court held that the state's homicide statute did not apply to a man who
violently ssaulted his former wife to purposefully destroy her fetus in Keeler v. Superior
Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 481 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1970).
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Under laws proposed by these commentators, a woman could

be held criminally liable for failing to eat well, 38 for using alcohol, tobacco,
or drugs,39 or for exposing her fetus to hazards in the workplace. 40 One
commentator has asserted that a woman should be subject to retrospective
criminal liability for all damaging acts and omissions before a child is
born, 41 and suggests that criminal penalties be imposed on pregnant women
42
at risk who fail to undergo certain prenatal screening.

B.

Maternal Conduct and the "Geography" of Pregnancy

Those who propose subjecting maternal conduct to criminal penalties
maintain that such liability is justified based on increased medical knowledge
about the unique way in which a pregnant woman may affect the outcome
of her pregnancy and the life of her future child. They argue that the use
of the criminal law is justified by a desire to "promote for the unborn a
' 43
healthy maturation until live birth, as well as a healthy life after birth.
While it is certainly true that virtually every act undertaken by a pregnant
woman affects and may pose a potential threat to her fetus and that "the
fetus cannot be harmed . . . in any way except through the woman's
body," 44 it is worthwhile to examine the factors affecting the development
of a fetus and influencing pregnancy outcomes before summarily advancing
maternal liability.
45
Approximately six million American women become pregnant each year.
46
Of these, 3.7 million give birth, and nearly 900,000 suffer miscarriages or

37. Parness I, supra note 26, at 97. See Mathieu, Respecting Liberty andPreventing Harm:
Limits of State Intervention in Prenatal Choice, 8 HAgv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 19 (1985);
Parness, The Abuse and Neglect of the Human Unborn: Protecting Potential Life, 20 FAm.
L.Q. 197 (1986) [hereinafter Parness II]; Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty and the Control of
Concejition, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. Ray. 405 (1983) [hereinafter Robertson I];
Robertson, The Right to Procreate and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. oF LEGAL MED. 333
(1982) [hereinafter Robertson II]; Shaw, supra note 12; Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The
Need to Provide Legal Protectionfor the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 1209 (1987) [hereinafter
Maternal Substance Abuse].
38. ParentalLiability, supra note 12, at 73-74.
39. Maternal Substance Abuse, supra note 37, at 1235.
40. Shaw, supra note 12, at 73.
41. Robertson II, supra note 37, at 352 n.92.
42. Robertson I, supra note 37, at 449.
43. Parness II, supra note 37, at 197. Others have questioned the legitimacy of this
justification and have asserted that the expansion of maternal liability and fetal rights is
motivated, in fact, by opposition to abortion and is deliberate in its attempt to separate fetal
from maternal interests. See Johnsen, A New Threat to Pregnant Women's Autonomy,
HASTINGS CENTER REP. Aug., 1987, at 33, 36 [hereinafter Johnsen II]; Johnsen I, supra note
12, at 611-12.7
44. Johnsen II, supra note 43, at 35.
45. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 3.
46. Gold, Kenny & Singh, Payingfor Maternity Care in the United States, 19 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 190, 191 (1987).
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still births. 47 One in seven mothers have problems during pregnancy, and
about nine in ten of those problems are major.4 8 Only four in ten mothers
go through pregnancy without experiencing any medical problem.4 9 Although
pregnancy and childbirth are generally safe, they are not risk free. Every
year, approximately eight women in 110,000 die from childbearing complications.5 This risk of death is three and one-half times greater for black
women than for whites.-"
Twenty percent of all infants born each year experience some form of
health problem, and almost ten percent of all babies born each year have
serious medical conditions.5 2 About seven percent of all newborns weigh
less than 2,500 grams. Such low birthweight is the greatest single determinant of fetal mortality in the United States.5 4 Low birthweight is an
indicator of inadequate fetal growth as a result of premature birth or poor
weight gain for a given period of gestation.5 Two-thirds of the infants who
die in the first twenty-eight days of life are low birthweight babies. 6 Those
who do survive this neonatal period are five times more likely to die in
their first year of life than normal birthweight babies.17 Furthermore, low
birthweight infants are more likely to suffer significant congenital anomalies
and neurodevelopmental handicaps."
A major study of the problem of preventing low birthweight conducted
by a committee of the National Institute of Medicine identified categories
of risk factors whose presence in an individual woman indicate an increased
chance of bearing a low birthweight infant. 59 Significantly, however, the
study reveals that environment and maternal behavior such as smoking,
poor nutrition, substance abuse and exposure to occupational hazards
constitute only one category of risk factors that may affect pregnancy
outcome 0 Other factors include demographic characteristics, medical risks
that can be identified before pregnancy and those that can be identified

47. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 3.
48. Gold, Kenny & Singh, supra note 46, at 192.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing NCHS, Advance Report of Final Mortality Statistics, 1984, 35
VrrAL STAxrssncs REP. Supp. 2, Table F (1986)).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.

MONTHLY

54. CoMMIrran TO STUDy THE PREVENTION OF Low BmRHwEicGHr, DIVISION OF HEALTH
PROMOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION, INsTru
OF MEDICINE, PREvErnNG Low BIRTHwEIGHT-SMMARY 1 (1986) [hereinafter Low BmITHWIGHT].

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2.
at 3-4.
at 5.
at 4-15.
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only during pregnancy, and risks associated with health care. 61 The study
also indicates the possibility that factors such as stress may have some
bearing on low birthweight, although the connection is less certain. 62
Of behavioral factors, the dangers of smoking 3 and drinking during
pregnancy are probably most understood, yet experts still do not agree on
the level of use which may present a danger to a developing fetus. 65 The
study also identified a connection between certain demographic data and a
wide range of environmental factors' effect on pregnancy outcome:
The relationship between socioeconomic status and low birthweight
suggests that a woman's response to her environment may have an
impact on pregnancy outcome; it may be, for example, that poverty is
a risk factor for low birthweight because of the high levels of stress
associated with being poor. Two types of stress have been examined in
numerous studies: physical stress and fatigue, particularly as related to
employment during pregnancy, and psychological distress resulting from
maternal attitudes toward pregnancy or from external stressors in the
environment. 6
Because demographic factors that indicate an increased risk of low birthweight are often interrelated, it has been difficult to define particular
independent effects. 67 What is known, however, is that teenagers and women
with less than twelve years of education are at greater risk of bearing a low
birthweight baby, and non-white infants are twice as likely to be born at
low birthweight and twice as likely to die in the neonatal period as white
68
infants.
The study further concluded that the overwhelming weight of the evidence
proves that prenatal care reduces low birthweight, and that those programs
of care which are most effective go beyond routine services to include
'69
"flexible combinations of education, psychosocial and nutrition services."
It was also disclosed that the number of women in the United States actually
receiving quality prenatal care in the first trimester of pregnancy may be
declining. 70 The study cited the following as barriers to early receipt of
prenatal care:

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Shino, Klebanoff & Rhoads, Smoking and Drinking During Pregnancy, 255 J.

A.M.A. 82 (1986); Simpson, A PreliminaryReport on Cigarette Smoking and the Incidence
of Prematurity, 73 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 808 (1957).

64. See E.L.

ABEL, FETAL ALcOHOL SYNDROME AND FETAL ALcOHOL EFFEcTs

(1984).

65. This is particularly true of alcohol use. Low BRTHwEimoHT, supra note 54, at 12. See
Mills, Graubard, Harley, Rhoads & Berendes, MaternalAlcohol Consumption and Birthweight:

How Much Drinking During Pregnancy Is Safe?, 252 J.A.M.A. 1875 (1984).
66. Low BTnWErnIOHT, supra note 54, at 12.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id. at 6-8.
69. Id. at 18-19.
70. Id. at 21.
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financial constraints such as inadequate insurance or lack of Medicaid
funds to purchase care; limited availability of maternity care providers,
particularly providers willing to serve socially disadvantaged or high-risk
pregnant women; insufficient prenatal services in some sites routinely
used by high-risk populations, such as Community Health Centers,
hospital outpatient clinics, and health departments; experiences, attitudes, and beliefs among women that make them disinclined to seek
prenatal care; poor or absent transportation and child care services; and
inadequate systems to recruit hard-to-reach women into care.1 '
Finally, the study concluded that full access to prenatal care will be assured
only if the public sector assumes fundamental responsibility for making
such services available.7 2 These "geographical" realities of pregnancy and
childbirth must be considered in the criminalization decision.

II.

Tim EFFECTS OF CRIMINALIZATION

In a system of criminal law, the legislature serves as the principal
lawmaker.73 As such, it must make decisions about the behavioral content
of its jurisdiction's penal code.7 4 These decisions, in turn, must necessarily
be based on each lawmaker's understanding of the purpose for invoking
criminal punishment and its potential effectiveness in achieving the desired
result. In assessing the utility of the criminal sanction to control maternal
conduct for the purpose of promoting fetal health, lawmakers must weigh
this proposed benefit with the costs to the individual woman, her fetus,
and society. This analysis begins with a brief examination of the rationale
of the criminal sanction followed by an application of the rationale to
maternal conduct. It concludes with a discussion of the costs of such
criminalization in the form of deterrence of socially valuable behavior, the
destruction of legally protected relationships and the diminished legitimacy
of the criminal law. 75

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. H. PACKER, THE Lmnrs oF Tma CiANAL SANCToN 92 (1968).
74. The problem of drafting a statute that would criminalize harmful maternal conduct is
not insignificant. In fact, one of the strongest arguments against criminalization is that it is
impossible to draft a statute that would give sufficient notice as to specific conduct that is
prohibited. It is an established principle of criminal law that a statute that "fails to give a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden" is void
for vagueness. U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). For the purposes of the following
discussion, the language contained in § 270 of the California Penal Code, see supra note 4,
will be used as a model of proposed legislation. Although the statute was held to be
inappropriate in People v. Stewart, (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 23, 1987) (No. M508197), that
determination was based on legislative history rather than content. See supra note 6.
75. See P. Low, J.C. JEFm is & R. BotNm, CAiamAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIAIS 105389 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Cun3NaAL LAW]. For a criticism of a "cost-benefit" approach to
criminalization, see Junker, Criminalizationand Criminogenesis, 19 UCLA L. Rav. 697 (1972).
For an application of this analysis to the problem of child abuse, see Rosenthal, Physical
Abuse of Children by Parents: The CriminalizationDecision, 7 Am. J. CRw. L. 141 (1979).
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The Rationale of the CriminalSanction

Henry Hart stated that it is the role of the criminal law to define "the
minimum conditions of man's responsibility to his fellows and [to hold]
him to that responsibility. ' 76 By defining minimum obligations, the criminal
law functions in two ways: First, it declares societal standards of valuable
moral behavior to be followed by its members, and second, it establishes
specific conduct to be prevented. That is, the criminal law functions by
preventing conduct and by condemning conduct. Thus a decision to criminalize particular conduct may not rest solely on society's ability to prevent
it, but may also rest on the value to society in institutionally condemning
such conduct. 77 In addition, pronouncing values and norms to be promoted
allows society to declare conduct which falls below those norms as wrong
or blameworthy-under some theories of criminal law a requirement for
criminal action. 7 Therefore, the justification for the use of the criminal
law in the case of maternal conduct must be found in the value asserted
by society in condemning harmful behavior and in its attempt to prevent
the behavior.
B.

The Benefits of Criminalization

As mentioned above, the criminal law may be employed for its preventative effects. These effects can be categorized as general deterrence, the
power the law has to cause the general population to conform to its standard,
and individual deterrence, the ability of the criminal law to prevent harmful
activity in a single individual. 79 Individual deterrence may be further defined
as the power to compel conformity through intimidation, rehabilitation,
and incapacitation.8 0
General deterrence is closely connected to the concept defined above as
the assertion of societal norms. 81 It is "the ability of the criminal law and
76. Hart, The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 410 (1958).
77. For example, the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse explained:
If society feels strongly enough about the impropriety of certain conduct, it may
choose to express this norm through the criminal law even though the behavior
is largely invisible and will be reduced only through effective operation of other
institutions of control .... The benefits consist of the value of society reaffirming
certain norms, together with a reinforcement of self-restraint by those who accept
society's judgment.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, DRUG USE IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN

PE~spacnrE 255 (1973), quoted in Rosenthal, supra note 75,
78. H. PACKER, supra note 73, at 62 ("It is a necessary

at 146.
but not sufficient condition of
punishment that the person on whom it is imposed is found to have committed an offense
under circumstances that permit his conduct to be characterized as blameworthy.").
79. Id. at 39-61.
80. Id. at 45-61; Rosenthal, supra note 75, at 147.

81. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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its enforcement to make citizens law-abiding" through its "frightening,"
"educational," and "habit-forming" effects.8 2 Through identifying minimum responsibilities and demonstrating the costs of falling below that
minimum, members of the population at large will adjust their own behavior
to conform. 3
Proponents of criminalization hold that this form of deterrence would
work to protect the fetus by providing "punishment that looms large in the
minds of those who might act negatively toward the unborn."' 4 They claim
that the creation of crimes that punish women who endanger their fetuses
would educate the public through "the publicity accompanying the trial,
conviction, and sentencing" of the "proper distinctions between good and
bad behavior." 5
Of course, the degree to which general deterrence may prevent harmful
conduct will depend on a number of factors, such as how extensively "fetal
abuse" crimes are prosecuted and how a woman distinguishes her own
behavior. If criminal laws are adopted but rarely enforced, their power to
educate the public is greatly reduced and may, in fact, have the effect of
diminishing the perceived value asserted.8 6 In addition, although a pregnant
woman might believe that endangering her fetus is wrong, if she does not
87
understand her conduct to be specifically forbidden, it will likely continue.

82. Andenaes, GeneralPrevention-Illusionor Reality, 43 CiM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
Sci. 176, 179-80 (1952).
83. Andenaes describes the conforming effects as "moralizing" and "habit-forming":
The idea is that punishment as a concrete expression of society's disapproval of
an act helps to form and to strengthen the public's moral code and thereby
creates conscious and unconscious inhibitions against committing crime. Unconscious inhibitions against committing forbidden acts can also be aroused without
appealing to the individual's concepts of morality. Purely as a matter of habit,
with fear, respect for authority, or social imitation as connecting links, it is
possible to induce favorable attitudes toward this or that action and unfavorable
attitudes toward another action.
Id. at 179. This analysis of general preventative effects assumes to some extent a rational
actor who will respond by maximizing pleasure and reducing pain. Packer, however, stresses
that the impact of general deterrence does not require a rational actor, but is effective against
all whose response to social institutions is largely automatic, i.e., to "all those who are
sufficiently socialized to feel guilty about breaking social rules and whose experience has led
them to associate feelings of guilt with forms of punishment." H. PACKER, supra note 73, at
42.
84. Parness I, supra note 26, at 117.
85. Id. at 117-18 (citing W.

LAFAvE

& A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CBmI A.LLAW 23-24

(1972)). While the existence of such a crime might serve to educate the public because of the
unique way that maternal conduct may be condemned, see supra notes 43-72 and accompanying
text, the crime might be perceived as functioning exclusively against women. Isolating a segment
of the population in such a manner would have an additional coercive effect.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 114-18.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 81-85. This is, perhaps, the cost to society of a
vague statute. A statute that makes a general crime of "fetal neglect" or "fetal endangerment"
would most certainly leave doubts about the degree to which normally value-neutral conduct,
such as smoking, is prohibited during pregnancy.
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In addition to general deterrent effects, the criminal law is said to promote
individual or "special deterrence.""8 This notion is based on the theory that
once subjected to the pain of punishment, a criminal actor is less likely to

recidivate. It is, as Andenaes stated, "the effect of punishment on the
punished."

9

The inhibiting force of special deterrence operates specifically

through the effects of rehabilitation and incapacitation on the individual
actor.
Rehabilitation refers to the attempt by society to prevent recidivism by
improving the lot of the criminal. This concept is often thought of as

"treatment" of the offender. At first, using rehabilitation as a justification
for criminalizing maternal conduct seems humane and consistent with the
goal of promoting healthy pregnancy outcomes. However, as Packer points

out, "[W]hat we do to the offender in the name of reform is being done
to him by compulsion and for our sake, not for his." 90 Rehabilitation as a
goal of criminal punishment is elusive. Aside from the ethical and consti-

tutional limitations to imposing behavioral reform on an offender, 9' there
is simply no means of assessing its effectiveness. Because it is so difficult
to predict individual criminal behavior, we cannot determine when rehabilitation is complete or whether non-recidivism is a result of treatment or
intimidation.
If, however, rehabilitation is not seen as a purpose of the criminal

sanction, but as a collateral objective which may be sought within a criminal
system, 92 one must ask if there are not more appropriate ways of "treating"
women who endanger their fetuses. Certainly prison is not the best method
or place for such a rehabilitation program. 93 The alternatives to imprison-

ment are equally problematic. Imposition of a fine may serve to aggravate
an already desperate financial situation, which may have contributed to the

88. H. PACKER, supra note 73, at 45-48. Packer calls this form of deterrence "intimidation."
Id. at 45.
89. Andenaes, supra note 82, at 180, quoted in Rosenthal, supra note 75, at 154.
90. H. PACKER, supra note 73, at 54. It is important to remember that "treatment" in
this context would mean reform of the woman's behavior, not to be confused with medical
treatment or attention to her fetus.
91. Consider, for example, the due process implications in using the threat of criminal
prosecution to coerce an offender into a treatment program.
92. CUMI AI LAw, supra note 75, at 21-22.
93. Additionally, for a woman who is still pregnant when sentenced, imprisonment could
be extremely dangerous for her fetus. See Barry, Quality of Prenatal Care for Incarcerated
Women Challenged, YouTH L. NEws, Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 1, 3 (representing the results of a
survey of women prisoners, indicating that only 44%/0 of pregnancies in prison end in live
birth, while 3470 end in miscarriages). Despite these obvious dangers, a superior court judge
in Washington, D.C. sentenced to prison a pregnant woman who had been found guilty of
forging $700 worth of checks until she gave birth. Although the woman's first-time offense
would not normally warrant jail time, the judge indicated that he wanted to protect her fetus
from her cocaine addiction. Sherman, supra note 8, at 1.
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harmful behavior. 94 Indeed, to the extent that neglect is a result of ignorance
and education seen as a remedy, one must ask why such programs would
be available only after a woman has been judged an offender. When the
mother's use of illegal drugs creates a risk for her fetus, the real question
is why the criminal law has not already been successful in dealing with the
underlying offense.
The argument for incapacitation as a means of individual deterrence
suffers from some of the same shortcomings as the argument put forth for
rehabilitation. The rationale for incapacitation is that as long as the offender
is incarcerated, she cannot recidivate. The limit to the use of this rationale
in the instance of maternal conduct is immediately apparent, and it brings
into question the motivation behind the punishment. Is a woman who has
been convicted of "fetal endangerment" to be incarcerated for the duration
of her current pregnancy or to prevent her from conceiving again? Given
the relationship of pregnancy, a woman can never be truly incapacitated
vis & vis her fetus.
Primarily because of the problems in quantifying the behavioral impact
of criminalization, assessing its benefits has proven difficult. Moreover,
another problem exists in the need to isolate the incremental preventative
effects of criminalization beyond those achieved by other forms of social
control. 95 This determination, of course, rests to some extent on how the
problem is initially defined. Commentators who believe that existing means
of control are insufficient have pointed to the criminal law not only as
increasing protection, but as a source for expanding civil liability by allowing
courts to look to criminal statutes to find social policy. 96 A final difficulty
in assessing the benefits of criminalizing specific conduct is determining at
what level of enforcement the costs of such criminalization begin to outweigh
the benefits.9 For example, the optimal scheme of enforcement to maintain
the effects of general deterrence may be far higher than the ability of the
criminal justice system to efficiently process the potential offenders.
C.

The Costs of Criminalization

The costs of criminalizing maternal conduct are as difficult to quantify
as the benefits, but they are more easily identified( These costs fall into
three major categories: the deterrence of socially valuable behavior, the
negative effects on the individual woman and her family, and the costs to
society inherent in the under-enforcement of its criminal law?

94.
during
95.
96.
Canu.N

Indeed, fining or imprisoning a woman who fails to secure adequate medical care
her pregnancy for financial reasons seems bizarre and even frightening.
CRumNAL LAw, supra note 75, at 1074.
Parness I, supra note 26, at 151 (citing W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON
LAw

14 (1972)).

n

97. CsnnnmA LAw, supra note 75, at 1075.
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Perhaps the greatest danger in adopting a statutory scheme of fetal neglect
or endangerment laws is that it will, in fact, deterwjomwen,$fomtseeking
by-their.. dctors. There are two
-tfea
eingurnedin
prenatal
concerns involved in this assumption. First, women and their fetuses will
not receive adequate care and the result will be more fetal and maternal
health problems and deaths. Medical groups in California recognized this
danger and issued the following statement after the arrest of Pamela Rae
Stewart:
Such prosecution is counterproductive to the public interest as it may
discourage a woman from seeking prenatal care or dissuade her from
providing accurate information to health care providers out of fear of
self-incrimination. This failure to seek proper care or to withhold vital
information concerning her health could increase the risks to herself and
her baby. 98
Another important concern is the effect of criminal prosecutions on the
doctor-patient relationship. Doctors currently have no affirmative duty to
order treatment or to report failure by their patients to follow their advice.9
Criminal laws directed at maternal conduct would impose such a duty and
have the effect of_ trmng.4 o
ad cvoa
gg
ph.sicians the pogero-.police. This is especially troublesome considering
evidence that indicates that it is the already poor physician-patient interaction
which may lead to misunderstandings and treatment refusals in the first
place.'00 Furthermore, imposing this duty on physicians separates the medical
interests of women from those of their fetuses and forces doctors to treat
the fetus as theirprimarypatient. The American Committeeof Obstetcians
and Ginecologists recognized the danger inherent in this conflict in an
opinion issued by its Committee on Ethics:
Two situations in which maternal and fetal interests can be potentially
divergent are 1) the pregnant woman may refuse a diagnostic procedure,
medical therapy, or a surgical procedure that may enhance or preserve
fetal well-being, and if denied may result in fetal morbidity or mortality;
and 2) the pregnant woman's behavior with respect to her health or life
style may be deleterious to the fetus....
...
Obstetricians should refrain from performing procedures that are
unwanted by a pregnant woman. The use of judicial authority to
implement treatment regimens in order to protect the fetus violates the
pregnant woman's autonomy. Furthermore, inappropriate reliance on

98. Declaration of the California Medical Association, the Southern California Public
Health Association, and the California Division of the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, contained in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 21. This was
precisely the effect the Stewart prosecution had in southern California. See id. at 21-24.
99. Nelson, Buggy & Weil, supra note 12, at 721.
100. Gallagher, supra note 10, at 553 n.224 (citing Appelbaum & Roth, Patients Who Refuse
Treatment in Medical Hospitals, 250 J. A.M.A. 1296, 1301 (1983)).
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judicial authority may lead to undesirable societal consequences .... 101
In addition, as one commentator has observed, the "availability of court
enforcement of physician decisions may actually encourage treatment refusals by delaying necessary changes in physician attitudes and behavior." 10 2
Not only would fetal neglect statutes force the breakdown of the relationship
between a woman and her doctor, their enforcement would destroy the
privilege of confidentiality where it is statutorily protected.'0
The second major cost of criminalization is its effect on the individual
woman and her family. Arrestroq cution.
d oictio-canhavz disastrous effects on a family unit. Imprisonment means that the woman is
n longer Wilable to care and provide for her family, and fines reduce
whatever resources are available to support the family and to provide medical
care for the pregnant woman herself.
The criminal law may also be seen as an intrusion into the private
relationship not only of the doctor and patient, but that of the parent and
child as well. The law has traditionally recognized a parental right in matters
of child-rearing'04 that is based on the presumption that parents act in their
child's interest:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important,
historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents
to act in the best interests of their children. 10
While courts have not found this relationship impenetrable, recognition of
a mother's medical decisionmaking as safe from state intrusion emphasizes
the importance of the family as a fundamental social value.1°0 The criminal
law might act to further weaken the family unit by its very methods of
detection and enforcement. As one commentator noted, "[W]omen would
live in constant fear that any accident or 'error' in judgment" could become
the basis for a criminal prosecution instigated "by a disenchanted husband
or relative." 1 7
Closely connected to this idea is the problem of crime detection. Proponents of criminalization have suggested that a woman should consider herself

101. ACOG Comm. Op. No. 55, Patient Choice: Maternal-Fetal Conflict (1987) (on file
with author).
102. Gallagher, supra note 10, at 54.
103. See, e.g., CAL. Evin. CODE § 994 (West 1966) (protecting the relationship only where
criminal action is not involved).
104. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFluer, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("[Flreedom of
personal choice in matters of ... family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
105. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
106. Smith, Disabled Newborns and the Federal Child Abuse Amendments: Tenuous Protection, 37 HAsxnias L.J. 765, 773 (1986).
107. Johnsen I, supra note 12, at 607.
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pregnant from the first day of a missed period and would be liable for any
act or omission until her pregnancy was definitely determined. 108 Under such
a statutory scheme, the state would be forced to use extremely intrusive
means to observe a pregnant woman's conduct to ensure she is conforming
to the law, perhaps even forcing her doctor and husband into the role of
informants. One commentator has written that in adopting any criminal
prohibition, evidence that the prohibition would require systematic use of
intrusive investigatory techniques should immediately make it suspect to
lawmakers.'0 9 Adoption of fetal neglect statutes would require the state to
use methods of enforcement that offend not only an individual woman's
right to bodily privacy, but the widely shared expectations of privacy held
by our society. 10
Finally, there are the larger costs to society involved with enforcement.
This idea involves two concepts: first, the direct cost to a community in
enforcement expenditures and lost 'opp.Q1unity costs," and second, the
larger cost to societ that occu wh itslawsariender-enforced.
-Tlidactual financial costs of any statutory scheme depend to some extent
on its level of enforcement."' However, it is obvious that these costs must
include the resources devoted to detection and punishment of criminals such
as police surveillance, court costs, and imprisonment. Although the expenditures of any criminal justice system are rarely identified with the costs of
enforcing a particular crime, fetal neglect laws would require special expenditures based on the nature of the "crime." In particular, the system must
be prepared to provide for the pregnancy as well as for the pregnant
offender, including medical and psychological care. Furthermore, applying
the rehabilitative model of punishment, the criminal justice system must
develop a program to protect the fetus and to prevent recidivism. The
resources consumed by enforcement would be lost to the system and could
not be used to enforce other laws" 2 or provide much-needed care for the
3
pregnant woman outside the criminal justice system.''
The larger cost involved is that associated with the under-enforcement of
any crime. As noted, the level of enforcement will vary depending on the
nature of the crime, the pervasiveness of the conduct, and the means
available to detect it. "4 Furthermore, to the extent that a "crime" of fetal
neglect is enforceable at all, it invites arbitrary prosecution and unevenness

108. Robertson I, supra note 37, at 447 n.129; Shaw, supra note 12, at 73.
109. H. PACKER, supra note 73, at 284-86.

110. See CRndiNA LAW, supra note 75, at 1076.
Id.
Id.

111.
112.
113.
114.

See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
See supra text accompanying note 112.
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in its administration."s The danger of under-enforcement of the criminal
law is linked to the concept of general deterrence." 6 The assertion of social
values worthy of protection through the criminal law is greatly weakened
when those laws are insufficiently enforced. As one commentator explained:
[L]aw enforcement pays a price for using the criminal law in this way.
First, the moral message communicated by the law is contradicted by
the total absence of enforcement; for while the public sees the conduct
condemned in words, it also sees in the dramatic absence of prosecutions
that it is not condemned in deed ....

Second, the spectacle of nulli-

fication of the legislature's solemn commands is an unhealthy influence
on law enforcement generally. It tends to breed a cynicism and an
indifference to the criminal-law processes which augment tendencies
toward disrespect for those who make and enforce the law, a disrespect
which is already widely in evidence ....

Finally, these laws invite

discriminatory enforcement against persons selected for prosecution on
grounds unrelated to the evil against which these laws are purportedly
addressed .... 117
In addition to the logistical difficulties in detecting harmful maternal conduct, the lack of a popular consensus about the validity of such a prohibition
makes the dangers of under-enforcement very real." 8
CONCLUSION

Despite medical advances we cannot ensure that every pregnancy will
result in a healthy baby. That goal must be pursued, however, by using the
most effective and humane means available to society. In a desire to prevent
the risks that present danger to a developing fetus, legislators have been
asked to enact _laws- which-engage -i full fereeaofithe crimin-!aw to

pumsh women for endangering their future children. In their decisionmaking
lawmakexs~must look- beyond -he argument ithat punishment .will prevent
these "crimes" and see the reality of a-pregnant-woman's-life, They must
recognize that women
do not decide in a vacuum how well they will eat, or how far into a
pregnancy they will work, or when they should seek or follow the advice
of a physician. They should not and cannot make these decisions solely
on the basis of what is most likely to reduce the chances of harming
the fetus. 9

115. See Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 1, at 34-35.
116. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
117. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization,374 ANNAIS 157, 160 (1967). See H. PACKER,
supra note 73, at 286-89.
118. BoNNmE, MARiJuANA USE AND CRnaumAL SANCTiONS 31-35 (1980), quoted in CQumAL
LAW, supra note 75, at 1078.
119. Johnsen II, supra note 43, at 36.
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Lawmakers must recognize that whatever beneficial deterrent effect criminalization might achieve will be overshadowed by the chilling effect it will
have on women's access to medical care. The costs to society in the
destruction of traditionally protected relationships and disrespect for the
law and lawmakers are too great to justify invocation of the criminal
sanction.
Finally, lawmakers must recognize that the greatest danger in the use of
criminal punishment is that it will actually prevent the situation from
improving. By applying the criminal law society will feel that something is
really being done to promote healthy pregnancies, and will be less likely to
engage in truly effective methods of protection, namely the investment of
human and economic resources to ensure that prenatal services are available
to every woman.
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